Arnie’s Olyroos get what they deserved
August 14th 2008 07:49
And so, the Olyroos have fallen at the first hurdle.
Sometimes, the losing side can display so much skill that it does not deserve to be beaten- like Australia during its World Cup playoff defeat by Iran in 1997. Sometimes, the losing side can display so much gallantry that it does not deserve to be beaten- like Australia during its World Cup playoff defeat by Argentina in 1993. Sadly, though, this Australian side was neither skilful enough nor gallant enough to deserve anything other than its early elimination from the Olympics.
Much has been made of the quirky selecting of Graham Arnold, who chose to drop several big names, most notably Bruce Djite and Nathan Burns. Yet having watched the Olyroos lumber through their matches against Serbia, Argentina and the Ivory Coast, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that although a more talented squad could hardly have done worse, it would not have done significantly better. For this was a failure not of personnel, but coaching.
The principal flaw was the one that has traditionally bedevilled Australian teams: an inability to keep possession. To cheaply surrender the ball is a sin at the best of times, but to do so against such gifted opponents- and so often- is sporting suicide. Nothing could be more elementary than the axiom that you can’t score if you don’t have the ball. How extraordinary, then, that this Australian team should have been programmed to give away possession time and time again.
Presumably, Arnold would emphatically deny that. Presumably, Arnold would retort that he had told his charges to retain possession. But what, besides issuing the order, did he do to enable it to be carried out? Did he drum into his squad that the player with the ball should be doing everything possible to keep it until an open man could be found? Did he drum into his squad that the players without the ball should be doing everything possible to put themselves into open space? Did he drum into his squad that long balls should be a final option, rather than the second last or third last or fourth last option available? Because if he didn’t, he was sending out a squad that was programmed to give away possession. Of course, the Olyroos must also accept responsibility for their failings, but if Arnold did not drum all those lessons into his squad, it is he, as coach, who deserves the greatest share of blame.
The contrast between the Australians and the Argentineans could not have been greater. Unlike the Olyroos, the South Americans had been programmed to keep the ball, with the result that they controlled the game. It was a similar story to the friendly that the two countries’ senior teams played at the MCG last year. The visitors maximised possession, and ran out deserved winners.
Although Argentinean teams are renowned for their possession football, it should not be imagined that this ability to keep the ball is due to an array of inventive tricks, or because they are able to whiz magical passes from one side of the field to the other. Yes, their technique is usually superior, but the vast majority of passes they make are simple. The person with the ball is conditioned to hold it until an open man can be found; and those without it are conditioned to make space for him. In this patient, deliberate way, they will work the ball forward, as the other side expends its energy attempting to get it off them.
That, indeed, was what happened at the MCG. While the Socceroos ran themselves ragged trying to win possession, the visitors were content to bat the ball around, probing for openings in the Australian defence. When, eventually, the hosts were able to win back the ball, their impatient and thoughtless approach usually ensured that it was handed straight back. Gallant though they were, there was an air of inevitability about their 1-0 defeat. You don’t score if you don’t have the ball!
And that brings us back to the point that Arnold’s Olyroos were programmed to surrender possession. Too many times, an Australian would receive possession in his own half, look up, see that there was no easy pass to be made, and thus hoof the ball downfield. Yet the long ball was generally not the final option available to him. In such instances, the player should have protected the ball, exhorted one of his teammates to make space for him, and then laid it off. Generally, it is difficult to find an open man in the opposition’s half, but there is nothing wrong with playing laterally, or dishing the ball to the goalkeeper. But even when the ball did make its way back to Adam Federici, more often than not the custodian would instinctively kick it away. Again, that long ball was generally not the final option; usually, a fullback would be open- or, if he wasn’t, he ought to have been.
For those who might suggest that Australians are not skilful enough to retain possession in their own half, and would be better served taking the so-called ‘safety first’ option of going long, a reality check is needed. Assuming that each side lines up in a 4-4-2 formation, then an Australian team with the ball in its own half will be pitting nine of its players (midfielders, defenders and goalkeeper) against the opposition’s six (midfielders and strikers). And in China, the Olyroos actually had 10 men in such situations, given Arnold’s preference for 4-5-1. With such superior numbers, they should have done a better job of retaining possession. But they didn’t- and that was because Arnold had programmed his squad to cheaply give it away.
For all Arnold’s passion for the green and gold, he is not up to the job. He is a coach who doesn’t understand what happens on the field. This may sound a harsh judgement, but Arnold is damned by his own words. After the brainless and insipid display against Serbia, he declared that he “was proud of all my players who worked very hard in trying conditions”. Having been given a footballing lesson by the Argentineans, Arnold focussed on how his men had “missed several chances”, while insisting that they had been “outstanding”. Commeting on the final game against Ivory Coast, in which the Africans were clearly superior, Arnold maintained that his Olyroos were again “outstanding”, but lamented the fact that the Ivorians had Salomon Kalou, who apparently “made all the difference”. Given such myopia, Arnold’s assessment of Australia’s poor tournament is predictable: “Disappointment aside, I am proud of the work the players put in and I think we have developed as a team.”
On the eve of the new A-League season, such a flawed outlook assumes greater significance. When one of Australian football’s most senior figures asserts that he is “proud” of players who routinely surrender possession, when one of Australian football’s most senior figures asserts that pumping long ball after long ball makes “outstanding” play, when one of Australian football’s most senior figures asserts that a repeated disinterest in keeping the ball equates to “development”, it is clear that the game has a serious problem. If such muddled thinking is going on in the head of one of Australian football’s most senior figures, what are his subordinates- the club coaches- thinking?
After all, it is from the A-League that most of the next generation of Olyroos will be drawn. For the sake of Australia’s 2012 Olympic campaign, let us hope that the A-League coaches will teach these youngsters to play a proper brand of football, in which possession is cherished and the brain is expected to work as hard as the legs. And let us hope that Graham Arnold is no longer coach.
Sometimes, the losing side can display so much skill that it does not deserve to be beaten- like Australia during its World Cup playoff defeat by Iran in 1997. Sometimes, the losing side can display so much gallantry that it does not deserve to be beaten- like Australia during its World Cup playoff defeat by Argentina in 1993. Sadly, though, this Australian side was neither skilful enough nor gallant enough to deserve anything other than its early elimination from the Olympics.
Much has been made of the quirky selecting of Graham Arnold, who chose to drop several big names, most notably Bruce Djite and Nathan Burns. Yet having watched the Olyroos lumber through their matches against Serbia, Argentina and the Ivory Coast, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that although a more talented squad could hardly have done worse, it would not have done significantly better. For this was a failure not of personnel, but coaching.
The principal flaw was the one that has traditionally bedevilled Australian teams: an inability to keep possession. To cheaply surrender the ball is a sin at the best of times, but to do so against such gifted opponents- and so often- is sporting suicide. Nothing could be more elementary than the axiom that you can’t score if you don’t have the ball. How extraordinary, then, that this Australian team should have been programmed to give away possession time and time again.
Presumably, Arnold would emphatically deny that. Presumably, Arnold would retort that he had told his charges to retain possession. But what, besides issuing the order, did he do to enable it to be carried out? Did he drum into his squad that the player with the ball should be doing everything possible to keep it until an open man could be found? Did he drum into his squad that the players without the ball should be doing everything possible to put themselves into open space? Did he drum into his squad that long balls should be a final option, rather than the second last or third last or fourth last option available? Because if he didn’t, he was sending out a squad that was programmed to give away possession. Of course, the Olyroos must also accept responsibility for their failings, but if Arnold did not drum all those lessons into his squad, it is he, as coach, who deserves the greatest share of blame.
The contrast between the Australians and the Argentineans could not have been greater. Unlike the Olyroos, the South Americans had been programmed to keep the ball, with the result that they controlled the game. It was a similar story to the friendly that the two countries’ senior teams played at the MCG last year. The visitors maximised possession, and ran out deserved winners.
Although Argentinean teams are renowned for their possession football, it should not be imagined that this ability to keep the ball is due to an array of inventive tricks, or because they are able to whiz magical passes from one side of the field to the other. Yes, their technique is usually superior, but the vast majority of passes they make are simple. The person with the ball is conditioned to hold it until an open man can be found; and those without it are conditioned to make space for him. In this patient, deliberate way, they will work the ball forward, as the other side expends its energy attempting to get it off them.
That, indeed, was what happened at the MCG. While the Socceroos ran themselves ragged trying to win possession, the visitors were content to bat the ball around, probing for openings in the Australian defence. When, eventually, the hosts were able to win back the ball, their impatient and thoughtless approach usually ensured that it was handed straight back. Gallant though they were, there was an air of inevitability about their 1-0 defeat. You don’t score if you don’t have the ball!
And that brings us back to the point that Arnold’s Olyroos were programmed to surrender possession. Too many times, an Australian would receive possession in his own half, look up, see that there was no easy pass to be made, and thus hoof the ball downfield. Yet the long ball was generally not the final option available to him. In such instances, the player should have protected the ball, exhorted one of his teammates to make space for him, and then laid it off. Generally, it is difficult to find an open man in the opposition’s half, but there is nothing wrong with playing laterally, or dishing the ball to the goalkeeper. But even when the ball did make its way back to Adam Federici, more often than not the custodian would instinctively kick it away. Again, that long ball was generally not the final option; usually, a fullback would be open- or, if he wasn’t, he ought to have been.
For those who might suggest that Australians are not skilful enough to retain possession in their own half, and would be better served taking the so-called ‘safety first’ option of going long, a reality check is needed. Assuming that each side lines up in a 4-4-2 formation, then an Australian team with the ball in its own half will be pitting nine of its players (midfielders, defenders and goalkeeper) against the opposition’s six (midfielders and strikers). And in China, the Olyroos actually had 10 men in such situations, given Arnold’s preference for 4-5-1. With such superior numbers, they should have done a better job of retaining possession. But they didn’t- and that was because Arnold had programmed his squad to cheaply give it away.
For all Arnold’s passion for the green and gold, he is not up to the job. He is a coach who doesn’t understand what happens on the field. This may sound a harsh judgement, but Arnold is damned by his own words. After the brainless and insipid display against Serbia, he declared that he “was proud of all my players who worked very hard in trying conditions”. Having been given a footballing lesson by the Argentineans, Arnold focussed on how his men had “missed several chances”, while insisting that they had been “outstanding”. Commeting on the final game against Ivory Coast, in which the Africans were clearly superior, Arnold maintained that his Olyroos were again “outstanding”, but lamented the fact that the Ivorians had Salomon Kalou, who apparently “made all the difference”. Given such myopia, Arnold’s assessment of Australia’s poor tournament is predictable: “Disappointment aside, I am proud of the work the players put in and I think we have developed as a team.”
On the eve of the new A-League season, such a flawed outlook assumes greater significance. When one of Australian football’s most senior figures asserts that he is “proud” of players who routinely surrender possession, when one of Australian football’s most senior figures asserts that pumping long ball after long ball makes “outstanding” play, when one of Australian football’s most senior figures asserts that a repeated disinterest in keeping the ball equates to “development”, it is clear that the game has a serious problem. If such muddled thinking is going on in the head of one of Australian football’s most senior figures, what are his subordinates- the club coaches- thinking?
After all, it is from the A-League that most of the next generation of Olyroos will be drawn. For the sake of Australia’s 2012 Olympic campaign, let us hope that the A-League coaches will teach these youngsters to play a proper brand of football, in which possession is cherished and the brain is expected to work as hard as the legs. And let us hope that Graham Arnold is no longer coach.
| 43 |
| Vote |
Shared on
Subscribe to this blog



















Comment by Buck
Arnold's time at the summit of Australian coaching must surely be over. We have a new generation of remarkable coaches taking A League clubs on remarkable runs. Arnold's last major tournaments in charge have been failures.
It's time to go... Arnie.